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ABSTRACT
Large-scale sensing and actuation infrastructures have al-
lowed buildings to achieve significant energy savings; at the
same time, these technologies introduce significant privacy
risks that must be addressed. In this paper, we present
a framework for modeling the trade-off between improved
control performance and increased privacy risks due to oc-
cupancy sensing. More specifically, we consider occupancy-
based HVAC control as the control objective and the loca-
tion traces of individual occupants as the private variables.
Previous studies have shown that individual location infor-
mation can be inferred from occupancy measurements. To
ensure privacy, we design an architecture that distorts the
occupancy data in order to hide individual occupant location
information while maintaining HVAC performance. Using
mutual information between the individual’s location trace
and the reported occupancy measurement as a privacy met-
ric, we are able to optimally design a scheme to minimize
privacy risk subject to a control performance guarantee. We
evaluate our framework using real-world occupancy data:
first, we verify that our privacy metric accurately assesses
the adversary’s ability to infer private variables from the
distorted sensor measurements; then, we show that control
performance is maintained through simulations of building
operations using these distorted occupancy readings.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Large-scale sensing and actuation infrastructures have en-
dowed buildings with the intelligence to perceive the sta-
tus of their environment, energy usage, and occupancy, and
to provide fine-grained and responsive controls over heat-
ing, cooling, illumination, and other facilities. However, the
information that is collected and harnessed to enable such
levels of intelligence may potentially be used for undesirable
purposes, thereby raising the question of privacy. To spot-
light the value of building sensory data and its potential for
exploitation in the inference of private information, we con-
sider as a motivating example the occupancy data, i.e., the
number of occupants in a given space over time.
Occupancy data is a key component to perform energy-
efficient and user-friendly building management. Particu-
larly, it offers considerable potential for improving energy
efficiency of the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
(HVAC) system, a significant source of energy consumption
which contributes to more than 50% of the energy consumed
in buildings [12]. Recent papers [4, 24, 13] have demon-
strated substantial energy savings of up to 40% by enabling
intelligent HVAC control in response to occupancy varia-
tions. The value of occupancy data in building management
has also inspired extensive research on occupancy sensing [9,
19, 20, 23, 35] as well as a number of commercial products
which can provide high accuracy occupancy data.
While people have enjoyed the benefits brought by oc-
cupancy data, the privacy risks potentially posed by the
data are largely overlooked (Figure 1). In effect, location
traces of individual occupants can be inferred from the occu-
pancy data with some auxiliary information [34]. Through-
out this paper, we refer to the individual location trace as
the private information to be protected. The contextual
information attached to location traces tells much about
the individuals’ habits, interests, activities, and relation-
ships [25]. It can also reveal their personal or corporate se-
crets, expose them to unwanted advertisement and location-
based spams/scams, cause social reputation or economic
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Figure 1: An overview of the problem of individual occupant
location recovery. The building manager collects occupancy
data to enable intelligent HVAC controls adapted to occu-
pancy variations. However, an adversary with malicious in-
tent may exploit occupancy data in combination with the
auxiliary information to infer privacy details about indoor
locations of building users.
damage, make them victims of blackmail or even physical
violence [31].
At a first glance, it is surprising that occupancy data may
incur risks of privacy breach, since it only reports the num-
ber of occupants in a given space over time without revealing
the identities of the occupants. To illustrate why it is pos-
sible to infer location traces from seemingly “anonymized”
occupancy data, consider the following scenario. We start
by observing two users in one room and then one of them
leaves the room and enters another room. We cannot tell
which one of the two made this transition by observing the
occupancy change. However, if the one who left entered an
private office, the user can be identified with high probabil-
ity based on the ownership of the office. Although a change
in occupancy data may correspond to location shifts of many
possible potential users, the knowledge of where the individ-
uals mostly spend their time rules out many possibilities and
renders the individual who made the transition identifiable.
It has been shown in [34] that by simply combining some
ancillary information, such as an office directory and user
mobility patterns, individual location traces can be inferred
from the occupancy data with the accuracy of more than
90%. It is, therefore, the objective of this paper to enable
an occupancy-based HVAC control system that provides pri-
vacy features for each user on a par with thermal comfort
and energy efficiency.
A simple yet effective way to preserve privacy is to ob-
fuscate occupancy data by injecting noise to make the data
itself less informative. This approach has been widely used
in privacy disclosure control of various databases, ranging
from healthcare [7], geolocation [2], web-browsing behavior
data [14], etc. While reducing the risk of privacy breach,
this approach would also deteriorate the utility of the data.
There have been attempts to balance learning the statistics
of interest reliably with safeguarding the private informa-
tion [32]. Cryptography [8] and access control [33] are also
effective means to ease privacy concerns, but they do not
provide protection against all privacy breaches. There may
be insiders who can access the private, decrypted data, or
the building manager may not want to have access to (and
responsibility for) the private data.
The objective of this paper cannot be attained by simply
extending the techniques developed previously. Our task is
more challenging. Firstly, as opposed to learning some fixed
statistics from static data in most database applications, the
data is used for controlling a highly complex and dynamic
system in our case, and the control performance relies on
the data fidelity. With highly accurate occupancy data, the
infrastructure can correctly sense the environment and en-
able proper response to occupancy variations; nevertheless,
the location privacy is sacrificed. On the other hand, the
usage of severely distorted occupancy data reduces the risks
of privacy leakage, but may lead to even higher levels of
energy consumption and discomfort. Essentially, we need
to address the trade-off between the performance of a con-
troller on a dynamical system, and, similarly, privacy of a
time-varying signal, i.e. the location traces of individual
occupants. Secondly, from the perspective of the building
manager, the building performance is paramount: adding
the privacy feature into the HVAC control system should
not impair the performance of HVAC controller in terms
of energy efficiency and thermal comfort. To achieve this,
the injected noise should be calculated to minimally affect
performance of the controller, while maximizing the amount
privacy gained from the distortion.
In this paper we develop a method which minimizes the
privacy risks incurred by collection of occupancy data while
guaranteeing the HVAC system operating in a “nearly” op-
timal condition. Our solution relies on an occupancy distor-
tion mechanism, which informs the building manager how
to distort occupancy data before any form of storage or
transport of the data. We draw the inspiration from the
information-theoretic approach in [29, 10] for characterizing
the privacy-utility trade-off, and choose the mutual informa-
tion (MI) between reported occupancy measurements and
individual location traces as our privacy metric. The design
problem of finding the optimal occupancy distortion mech-
anism is cast as an optimization problem where the privacy
risk is minimized for a set of constraints on the controller
performance. This allows us to find points on the Pareto
frontier in the utility-privacy trade-off, and to further an-
alyze the economic side of privacy concerns [30]. The for-
mulation can be easily generalized to resolve the tension be-
tween privacy and data utility in other cases where a control
system utilizes some privacy-sensitive information as one of
the control inputs, although in this paper we limit our fo-
cus to addressing the privacy concern of occupancy-based
HVAC controller. In addition, our work here is complemen-
tary to the work being done in the cryptography communi-
ties: we can use our distortion mechanism to process sensor
measurements, and then transmit the processed measure-
ments across secure channels. Our work also serves as a
complement for the privacy-preserving access control pro-
tocol in [33], as it provides distortion mechanisms against
adversaries who might be able to subvert the protocol while
still retaining the benefits for the occupancy data.
The main contributions of our paper are as follow:
• We present a systematic methodology to characterize
the privacy loss and control performance loss.
• We develop a holistic and tractable framework to bal-
ance the privacy pursuit and control performance.
• We evaluate the trade-off between privacy and HVAC
control performance using the real-world occupancy
data and simulated building dynamics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
reviews the existing work on occupancy-based control algo-
rithms and privacy metrics. Section 3 describes the models
connecting location and occupancy, and the HVAC system
model that will be considered in this paper. In Section 4 we
present a framework for quantifying the trade-off between
privacy and controller performance. We will evaluate the
framework and demonstrate its practical values based on
experimental studies in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2. RELATEDWORK
2.1 Occupancy-based HVAC control
Occupancy-based HVAC systems exploit real-time occu-
pancy measurements to condition the space appropriate to
usage. The occupancy-based controllers in the existing work
can be categorized into two types: rule-based controller and
optimization-based controller or model predictive control
(MPC). The rule-based controller uses an “if condition then
action” logic for decision making in accordance with occu-
pancy variations [13, 4]. MPC is a more advanced control
scheme, which employs a model of building thermal dynam-
ics in order to predict the future evolution of the system, and
solves an optimization problem in real-time to determine
control actions [27]. A number of papers including [16, 17,
3] analyzed in large-scale simulative or experimental studies
the energy saving potential in building climate control by
using MPC, which was shown to be well-suited for building
applications. This leads to our choice of MPC to exemplify
the trade-off between controller performance and privacy.
Occupancy information can be leveraged in different ways
in an MPC-based controller. One approach is to build an oc-
cupancy model to predict future occupancy based on which
the MPC optimizes control actions [5]. Another method is to
use the instantaneous occupancy measurement and consider
it to be constant during the control horizon of MPC [15].
This method has been demonstrated to achieve comparable
performance with the MPC that exploits occupancy predic-
tions. We will thus without loss of generality follow the
latter set-up to avoid explicit modeling of occupancy.
2.2 Privacy
Privacy, although not a new topic, has recently developed
renewed interest, due in no small part to new technologies
and modern infrastructures collecting and storing unprece-
dented amounts of data. Since privacy is an abstract and
subjective concept, it is necessary to develop proper mea-
sures for privacy before any privacy protection technique is
discussed.
Differential privacy [11] is one of the most popular met-
rics for privacy from the area of statistical databases. It is
is typically assured by adding appropriately chosen random
noise to the database output. However, calculating optimal
noise for differential privacy is very difficult, and research
on the applications of differential privacy mostly assumes
the injected noise to be an additive zero-mean Gaussian
or Laplacian random variable, which offers no guarantee
on data utility. As mentioned in the introduction, in our
case the performance of HVAC control systems is crucial:
as such, our work is an effort to maintain control efficacy by
optimally designing noise distribution to maximize privacy
subject to a performance guarantee.
Recently, MI has become a popular privacy metric [29, 10,
18]. Intuitively, MI reflects the change in the uncertainty of
a private variable due to the observation of a public random
variable. In fact, it is the only metric of information leak-
age that satisfies the data processing inequality [18]. Unlike
differential privacy, this requires some modeling of the ad-
versary’s available ancillary information; however, in prac-
tice, we can suppose an adversary with access to a large
amount of ancillary information, which gives a bound on any
weaker adversary’s performance. A framework for charac-
terizing privacy-utility trade-off based on MI was proposed
in [10], where the MI between a private variable and a dis-
torted measurement is minimized subject to the bound on
the value of an exogenous distortion metric that measures
the utility loss from replacing a true measurement with a
distorted measurement. Our work is an extension of [10]
to the situations where dynamics at present. We propose a
method to abstract out control performance of a dynamical
system into a distortion metric, as well as a set of reason-
able assumptions for the probabilistic dependencies between
occupancy and location data, which allow us to re-write our
privacy metric on time-series data into a static situation akin
to that developed in [10].
3. PRELIMINARIES
This section collects the concepts we need before introduc-
ing the theoretical framework that characterizes the trade-
off between privacy and control performance in Section 4.
Two models are described: the occupancy-location model
that formulates the relationship between occupancy obser-
vations and individual location traces, and the model for the
HVAC system. We will first consider an occupancy detec-
tion system that can collect noise-free or true occupancy,
which is then processed by a distortion mechanism into the
obfuscated data that the controller observes. We will see
the distortion can be similarly applied to noisy occupancy,
as elaborated in Section 4.
3.1 Occupancy-location model
Suppose the building of interest consists of N zones rep-
resented by Z = {z0, z1, · · · , zN}, where a special zone z0
is added to refer to the outside of the building. Let O =
{o1, · · · , oM} denote the set of occupants. The location of
occupant om at time k is a random variable denoted by
X
(m)
k which takes values in the set Z, for m = 1, · · · ,M .
The true occupancy of zone zn at time k is denoted by Y
n
k ,
n = 0, 1, · · · , N . Y nk takes values from {0, 1, · · · ,M}, where
M is the total number of occupants in the building. Note
that the true occupancy and individual location traces are
connected by Y nk =
∑M
m=1 1[X
(m)
k = zn], where 1[·] is the
indicator function.
Additionally, we suppose that the controller observes a
distorted version of the true occupancy, denoted by V nk which
takes values from {0, 1, . . . ,M}. P(V nk |Y nk ) represents the
distortion mechanism we wish to design. If no distortion
on the occupancy data is applied, then V nk = Y
n
k . We fur-
ther define some shorthands: X
(1:M)
k := {X(1)k , · · · , X(M)k },
V 1:Nk := {V 1k , · · · , V Nk }.
We make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. The location traces for different occupants
are mutually independent: P(X(1:M)k ) =
∏M
m=1 P(X
(m)
k ).
Assumption 2. The location trace for any given occupant
om, m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, has the first-order Markov property:
P(X(m)k |X(m)k−1, X(m)k−2, . . . , X(m)1 ) = P(X(m)k |X(m)k−1) (1)
Assumption 3. The true occupancy Y nk is a sufficient stat-
istics for V nk , i.e., P(V nk |X(1:M)k ) = P(V nk |Y nk ).
Assumption 3 is naturally justified since the distribution
of V nk depends only on the value of Y
n
k in our distortion
mechanism. The first two assumptions are necessary to de-
sign the optimal distortion method, but we will show that
our distortion method will work on the real-world occu-
pancy dataset, which provides a support for Assumption 1
and 2. These assumptions allow us to model occupancy
and location traces via the Factorial Hidden Markov model
(FHMM), illustrated in Figure 2. The FHMM consists of
several independent Markov chains evolving in parallel, rep-
resenting the location trace of each occupant. Since we only
observe the aggregate occupancy information, the location
traces are considered to be hidden states.
Xk−1(m ) Xk(m ) Xk+1(m )
Xk−1(M ) Xk(M ) Xk+1(M )
Xk−1(1) Xk(1) Xk+1(1)
Vk−11 Vk1 Vk+11
Vk−1n Vkn Vk+1n
Occupant om’s 
Location Trace 
Zone zm’s 
Occupancy 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
… … …
 
Occupant o1’s 
Location Trace 
Occupant oM’s 
Location Trace 
Zone z1’s 
Occupancy 
…
…
…
… 
… 
… 
…
 
Figure 2: The graphical model representation of the FHMM
model.
The FHMM model can be specified by the transition prob-
abilities and emission probabilities. The transition probabil-
ities describe the mobility pattern of an occupant, which is
denoted as a (N + 1) × (N + 1) transition matrix. We de-
fine the transition matrix for occupant om as A
(m) = [a
(m)
ij ],
i, j = 0, 1, · · · , N , where a(m)ij = P(X(m)k+1 = zj |X(m)k = zi)
for k = 0, 1, · · · ,K − 1. The transition parameters can be
learned from the occupancy data based on maximum like-
lihood estimation. If the prior knowledge about the past
location traces is also available, it can be encoded as the
prior distribution of transition parameters from a Bayesian
point of view, and then the transition parameters can be
learned via maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimation. We
refer the readers to [34] for the details of parameter learning.
The emission probabilities characterize the conditional dis-
tribution of distorted occupancy given the location of each
occupant, defined by
P(V 1:Nk |X(1:M)k ) =
N∏
n=1
P(V nk |X(1:M)k ) =
N∏
n=1
P(V nk |Y nk ) (2)
The above equalities result from Assumption 3, which, in
other words, indicates that the distorted occupancy depends
on individual location traces only via the true occupancy.
3.2 HVAC system model
Suppose the thermal comfort of the building space of in-
terest is regulated by the HVAC system shown in Figure 3,
which provides a system-wide Air Handling Unit (AHU) and
Variable Air Volume (VAV) boxes distributed at the zones.
In this type of HVAC system, the outside air is conditioned
at the AHU to a setpoint temperature Ta by the cooling coil
inside. The conditioned air, which is usually cold, is then
supplied to all zones via the VAV box at each zone. The
VAV box controls the supply air flow rate to the thermal
zone, and heats up the air using the reheat coils at the box,
if required. The control inputs are temperature and flow
rate of the air supplied to the zone by its VAV box. The
AHU outlet air temperature setpoint Ta is assumed to be
constant in this paper. The HVAC system models described
in the subsequent paragraphs will follow [22, 5, 15] closely1.
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Figure 3: A schematic of a typical multi-zone commercial
building with a VAV-based HVAC system.
State model. With reference to the notations in Table 1,
the continuous time dynamics for the temperature Tn of
zone zn can be expressed as
Cn
d
dt
Tn = Rn ·T +Qn + m˙ns cp(Tns − Tn) (3)
where the superscript n indicates that the associated quanti-
ties are attached to zone zn. T := [T
1, · · · , TN ] is a vector of
temperature of all N zones. Rn indicates the heat transfer
among different zones and outside. Qn is the thermal load,
which can be obtained by applying a thermal coefficient co
to the number of occupants V n, i.e., Qn = coV
n. The con-
trol inputs Un := [m˙ns , T
n
s ] are the supply air mass flow rate
and temperature. Assuming m˙ns , T
n
s and Q
n are zero-order
held at sample rate ∆t, we can discretize (3) using the trape-
zoidal method and obtain a discrete-time model, which can
be expressed as
Cn
Tnk+1−Tnk
∆t
=Rn·Tk+coV nk +m˙ns,kcp
(
Tns,k−
Tnk+1+T
n
k
2
)
(4)
where k is the discrete time index and Tnk = T
n
t |t=k∆t. Qnk ,
m˙ns,k and T
n
s,k are similarly defined.
Cost function. The control objective is to condition
the room while minimizing the energy cost. The power
consumption at time k consists of reheating power Pnh,k =
cp
ηh
m˙ns,k(T
n
s,k−Ta), cooling power Pnc,k = cpηc m˙
n
s,k(To−Ta) and
1Controlling the flow rate is actually more preferable in
building codes in consideration of energy efficiency. Herein,
we consider both reheat temperature and flow rate are con-
trollable, while the HVAC model with flow rate as the only
control input is a simple application of our model.
Param. Meaning Value & Units
∆t Discretization step 60s
cp Thermal capacity of air 1kJ/(kg ·K)
Cn Thermal capacity of the env. 1000kJ/K
co Thermal load per person 0.1kW
R Heat transfer vector 0kW/K
ηh Heating efficiency 0.9
ηc Cooling efficiency 4
β System parameter 0.5kW · s/kg
re Electricity price 1.5 · 10−4$/kJ
rh Heating fuel price 5 · 10−6$/kJ
T Upper bound of comfort zone 24◦C
T Lower bound of comfort zone 26◦C
Ta AHU outlet air temperature 12.8
◦C
ms Minimum air flow rate 0.0084kg/s
ms Maximum air flow rate 1.5kg/s
Th Heating coil capacity 40
◦C
Table 1: Parameters used in the HVAC controller.
fan power Pnf,k = βm˙
n
s,k, where ηh and ηc capture the effi-
ciencies for heating and cooling side, respectively. β stands
for a system dependent constant. We introduce several pa-
rameters to reflect utility pricing, re for electricity and rh
for heating fuel. These parameters may vary over time.
Therefore, the total utility cost of zone zn from time k =
1, · · · ,K is Jn = ∑Kk=1((re,kPnf,k+rh,kPnh,k+re,kPnc,k)∆t).
Constraints. The system states and control inputs are
subject to the following constraints:
C1: T ≤ Tnk ≤ T , comfort range;
C2: m˙s ≤ m˙ns,k ≤ m˙s, minimum ventilation requirement
and maximum VAV box capacity;
C3: Tns,k ≥ Ta, heating coils can only increase tempera-
ture;
C4: Tns,k ≤ Th, heating coil capacity.
These constraints hold at all times k and all zones {zn}Nn=1.
MPC controller. Knitting together the models describ-
ed above, we present an MPC-based control strategy for
the HVAC system to efficiently accommodate for occupancy
variations. In this control algorithm, we assume that the
predicted occupancy during the optimization horizon to be
the same as the instanteneous occupancy observed at the
beginning of control horizon. It was shown to be in [15] that
the control algorithm with this assumption can achieve com-
parable performance with the MPC that constructs explicit
occupancy model to predict occupancy for future time steps.
Let U1:N1:K be the shorthand for {Unk |k = 1, · · · ,K, n =
1, · · · , N}. The optimal control inputs for the next K time
steps are obtained by solving minU1:N1:K
∑N
n=1 J
n, subject to
the inequality constraints C1-C4 and the equality constraint
(4) and Tn1 = T
n
init, ∀n = 1, · · · , N , where Tninit is the initial
temperature of zone zn at each MPC iteration. We can see
that the optimal control input is a function of the distorted
occupancy that the controller sees and the initial tempera-
ture. We express this relationship explicitly by denoting the
optimal control action at zone zn as U
n
MPC(V
n, Tninit) . In
addition, the energy cost incurred by applying the optimal
control action is denoted by JnMPC(U
n
MPC(V
n, Tninit), Y
n),
where the second argument stresses that the actual control
cost is dependent on the real occupancy.
4. PRIVACY-ENHANCED CONTROL
With the HVAC model established, we can now develop
the mathematical framework to discuss a privacy-enhanced
architecture. We will first introduce MI as the metric we use
throughout the paper to quantify privacy, and then present a
method to optimally design the distortion mechanism which
minimizes the privacy loss within a pre-specified constraint
on control performance.
4.1 Privacy metric
Definition 1. [6] For random variables X and V , the mu-
tual information is given by:
I(X;V ) = H(X)−H(X|V ) (5)
where H(X) and H(X|V ) represent entropy and conditional
entropy, respectively. Let PX(x) = P(X = x), H(X) and
H(X|V ) are defined as
H(X) = −
∑
x
PX(x) log(PX(x)) (6)
H(X|V )=−
∑
v
PV (v)
(∑
x
PX|V(x|v) log
(
PX|V(x|v)
))
(7)
Remark. Entropy measures uncertainty about X, and con-
ditional entropy can be interpreted as the uncertainty about
X after observing V . By the definition above, MI is a mea-
sure of the reduction in uncertainty about X given knowl-
edge of V . We can see that it is a natural measure of privacy
since it characterizes how much information one variable
tells about another. It is also worth noting that inference
technologies evolve and MI as a privacy metric does not de-
pend on any particular adversarial inference algorithm [29]
as it models the statistical relationship between two vari-
ables.
In this paper, we will be using the MI between location
traces and occupancy observations, i.e., I(X
(1:M)
k ;V
1:N
k ), as
a metric of privacy loss. This metric reflects the reduction
in uncertainty about location traces X
(1:M)
k due to observa-
tions of V 1:Nk . As a proof of concept, we will verify that this
metric serves as an accurate proxy for an adversary’s ability
to infer individual location traces in the experiments. We
further introduce some assumptions which allow us to sim-
plify the expression of the privacy loss and obtain a form of
MI that has direct relationship with the distortion mecha-
nism P (V nk |Y nk ) we wish to design.
Based on results in ergodic theory [21], we know that
the probability distribution of individual location traces will
converge to a unique stationary distribution under very mild
assumptions2. For more details on stationary distributions,
we refer the readesr to [21]. This observation justifies the
following:
Assumption 4. The Markov chains X
(m)
k have a unique
stationary distribution for all occupants om and are dis-
tributed according to those stationary distributions for all
time steps k.
Combining this assumption and the occupancy-location
model we presented in the preceding section, we present a
2Since there are only finitely many zones, a sufficient con-
dition is the existence of a path from zi to zj with positive
probability for any two zones zi and zj .
proposition that allows us to great simplify the form of the
privacy loss:
Proposition 1. By Assumption 3, we have that:
I(X
(1:M)
k ;V
1:N
k ) = I(Y
1:N
k ;V
1:N
k ) (8)
By Assumption 4, we have that I(Y 1:Nk ;V
1:N
k ) is a con-
stant for all k, so we will drop the subscript: I(Y 1:N ;V 1:N ).
Finally, by the various conditional independences intro-
duced in Assumption 3:
I(Y 1:N ;V 1:N ) =
N∑
n=1
I(Y n;V n) (9)
Remark. The result that I(Y 1:Nk ;V
1:N
k ) is a constant value
for all k allows us to design a single distortion mechanism
P (V n|Y n) for all time steps (note that we drop the sub-
script k to indicate the time-homogeneity of the distortion
mechanism). By Proposition 1, minimization of privacy loss
I(X
(1:M)
k ;V
1:N
k ) can be conducted by minimizing a simpler
expression
∑N
n=1 I(Y
n;V n).
4.2 Optimal distortion design
We wish to find a distortion mechanism P (Y n|V n) that
can produce some perturbed occupancy data with minimum
information leakage, while the performance of the controller
using the perturbed occupancy data is on a par with that
using true occupancy. To be specific, we will bound the
difference of energy costs incurred by the controllers seeing
distorted and real occupancy data.
Let Tinit1 and Tinit2 be initial temperature of the con-
troller using distorted and real occupancy, respectively. Re-
call that UnMPC(V
n, Tninit) and J
n
MPC(U
n
MPC(V
n, Tninit), Y
n)
stand for the optimal control actions and the associated cost
based on the distorted occupancy; correspondingly, if the
controller sees the real occupancy data, the optimal control
action and the associated cost will be UnMPC(Y
n, Tninit) and
JnMPC(U
n
MPC(Y
n, Tninit), Y
n), respectively. We denote the
resulting temperature after applying optimal control actions
as TnMPC(U
n
MPC(V
n, Tninit), Y
n), where the second argument
emphasizes that the temperature evoluation depends on the
true occupancy. We introduce the following constraints:
∀|Tinit1 − Tinit2| ≤ ∆′T , y = 0, · · · ,M , n = 1, · · · , N ,
C5: Cost difference constraint
EP(V n|Y n=y)
[
JnMPC
(
UnMPC(Tinit1, V
n), y
)−
JnMPC
(
UnMPC(Tinit2, y), y
)] ≤ ∆ (10)
C6: Resulting temperature constraint
EP(V n|Y n=y)
[∣∣TnMPC(UnMPC(Tinit1, V n), y)−
TnMPC
(
UnMPC(Tinit2, y), y
)∣∣] ≤ ∆T (11)
C5 states that the cost difference between using the dis-
torted occupancy measurements V n and using the ground
truth occupancy measurements Y n is bounded by ∆ in ex-
pectation, for any possible value of Y n. The cost difference
can be regarded as the control performance loss due to the
usage of distorted data, and ∆ stands for the tolerance on
the control performance loss. C5 alone is a one-step perfor-
mance guarantee, that is, it only bounds the cost difference
associated with a single MPC iteration. In practice, MPC is
repeatedly solved from the new initial temperature, yielding
new control actions and temperature trajectories. In order
to offer a guarantee for future cost difference, we introduce
another constraint C6 on the resulting temperature differ-
ence of one MPC iteration. The idea is that the resulting
temperature will become the new initial temperature of the
next MPC iteration. If the resulting temperature difference
between using distorted occupancy data and using true oc-
cupancy data is bounded within a small interval ∆T , in the
next MPC iteration C5 will provide a bound on cost dif-
ference for new initial temperatures that do not differ too
much, since the cost difference constraint C5 is imposed to
hold for all |Tinit1−Tinit2| ≤ ∆′T . Typically, ∆′T is set to be
similar to ∆T , but a small value of ∆
′
T is preferred in order
to assure the feasibility of the optimization problem (since
the number of constraints increases with ∆′T ).
Now, we are ready to present the main optimization for
privacy-enhanced HVAC controller by combining the privacy
metric and performance constraint just presented. Suppose
the assumptions of Proposition 1 hold. Given the control
performance loss tolerance ∆, the optimal distortion mech-
anism is given by solving:
min
P(V n|Y n)
n=1,··· ,N
N∑
n=1
I(Y n;V n) (12)
subject to the constraint C5-C6. ∆ serves as a knob to
adjust the balance between privacy and the controller per-
formance loss. Increasing ∆ leads to larger feasible set for
the optimization problem, and thus a smaller value of MI (or
privacy loss) is expected. Using the methodology presented
in Section 3, we are able to calculate the terms inside the
expectation in (10) and (11) for all |Tinit1 − Tinit2| ≤ ∆′T
and y = 0, · · · ,M . Treating these as constants, calculating
the optimal privacy-aware sensing mechanism is a convex
optimization program, and can be efficiently solved. Addi-
tionally, since the constraints are enforced for each zone,
the optimization (12) can actually be decomposed to N
sub-problems and thus we can solve the optimal distortion
scheme separately for each zone.
Remark on noisy occupancy data. In the preced-
ing privacy-enhanced framework, we consider the occupancy
can be accurately detected. In practice, the occupancy data
may be noisy itself, and thereby the distortion mechanism
will be designed based on noisy occupancy Wnk instead of
true occupancy Y nk . In effect, the distortion designed using
noisy occupancy provides an upper bound on the privacy
loss. That is, in practice we could use noisy occupancy to
design the distortion mechanism and the realized privacy
loss can only be lower than the minimum privacy loss ob-
tained from the optimization. Note that we have the Markov
relationship: Y nk → Wnk → V nk when the distortion is ap-
plied to noisy data. Then the proof follows from the data
processing inequality [6].
5. EVALUATION
5.1 Experiment Setup
Occupancy dataset. The occupancy data used in this
paper is from the Augsburg Indoor Location Tracking Bench-
mark [28], which includes location traces for 4 users in a of-
fice building with 15 zones. The location data in the bench-
mark dataset was recorded every second over a period of 4 to
9 weeks. Since the dataset contains some missing observa-
tions due to technical issues or the vacation interruption, we
finally use the dataset from November 5th to 24th in our ex-
periment, during which the location traces of all the 4 users
are complete, and subsample the dataset with 1-minute res-
olution. The ground truth occupancy data was synthesized
by aggregating the locations trace of each user. Table 2
shows two statistics of the benchmark dataset. Notably, of
all transitions per day, 66.7% to 84.6% either start from or
end at one’s own office, and office location can divulge one’s
identity. This sheds light on why location traces of indi-
vidual users can be actually inferred from the “anonymized”
occupancy data.
User avg # of transitions avg % of transitions
per day from/to office per day
1 9.3 84.6%
2 20.2 75.4%
3 9.9 66.7%
4 7.6 75.5%
Table 2: The average number of transitions each user made
in each workday, and the average percentage of transitions
from or to one’s office.
Adversary inference. We consider the adversary to be
an insider with authorized building automation system ac-
cess. One can think of it as the worst case of privacy breach,
because insiders not only learn the ancillary information that
is public-available, but are familiar with building operation
policies. To be specific, the following auxiliary information
is assumed to be available to the adversary: (1) Building
directory and occupant mobility patterns, encoded by the
transition matrix of each occupant3; (2) Occupancy distor-
tion mechanism designed by building manager.
The adversary attempts to reconstruct the most probable
location trace given the occupancy data and the auxiliary
information. That is, the attack is to find the MAP of lo-
cation traces given the other information. The approach to
finding MAP is well known as Viterbi algorithm in HMM.
However, Viterbi is infeasible in the FHMM case as the loca-
tion traces to be solved reside in a exponentially large state
space (NM ×K). We propose a fast inference method based
on Mixed Integer Programming, and thus more efficiently
evaluate the adversary’s inference attack. The interested
readers are referred to the code implementation of this pa-
per for the details of the fast inference algorithm.
Controller parameters. Without loss of generality, we
consider the zones have the same thermal properties. The
comfort range of temperature in the zones is defined to be
within 24−26◦C as in [26]. The minimum flow rate is set to
be 0.084kg/s to fulfill the minimum ventilation requirement
for 25m2-sized zone as per ASHRAE ventilation standard
62.1-2013 [1]. The optimization horizon of the MPC is 120
min, and the control commands are solved for and updated
every 15 min [15]. Other design parameters are shown in
Table 1, which bascially follows the choices in [22].
3 In the experiment, we use 4 days’ occupancy data and 2
days’ location traces to learn these parameters and the rest
for evaluating our framework.
Platform. The algorithms are implemented in MAT-
LAB; The interior-point algorithm is used to solve the bi-
linear optimization problem in MPC. To encourage the re-
search on the privacy-preserving controller, the codes in-
volved in this paper will be open-sourced in http://people.
eecs.berkeley.edu/˜ruoxijia/code.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 MI as proxy for privacy
We solve the MI optimization for different tolerance lev-
els of control performance deterioration due to the usage of
the distorted data, i.e., ∆, and obtain a set of optimal dis-
tortion designs and corresponding optimal values of MI. We
then randomly perturb the true occupancy data using the
different distortion designs, and infer location traces from
the perturbed occupancy data. Monte Carlo (MC) simula-
tions are carried out to assess results under the random dis-
tortion design. The inference accuracy is defined to be the
ratio between the counts of correct location predictions over
the total time steps. Figure 4 demonstrates the monotoni-
cally increasing relationship between adversarial location in-
ference accuracy and MI, which justifies the usage of MI as
a measure of privacy loss. When the adversary has perfect
occupancy data, individual location traces can be inferred
with accuracy of 96.81%. On the contrary, when the MI ap-
proaches zero, the adversary tends to estimate the location
of each user to be constantly outside of the building, which
is the best estimate the adversary can generate based on
the uninformative occupancy data since people spend most
of their time in a day outside. In this case, the inference
accuracy is 77% but the adversary actually has no knowl-
edge about users’ movement. This serves as a baseline of
the adversarial location inference performance.
Figure 4: The adversary location inference accuracy in-
creases as MI increases. The black line and the band around
it show the mean and standard deviation of inference accu-
racy across ten MC simulations, respectively. The black
square shows the location inference accuracy if the adver-
sary sees true occupancy data. The black triangle gives the
accuracy when the adversary outputs a constant location
estimate.
5.2.2 Utility-Privacy Trade-off
Figure 5 shows the variation of privacy loss and controller
performance loss with respect to different choices of ∆, which
is the theoretical guarantee on controller performance loss.
It is evident that privacy loss and control performance loss
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Figure 5: The changes of MI and actual control cost dif-
ference between using true and perturbed occupancy as the
theoretical control cost difference changes. The blue dot line
and errorbar demonstrate the mean and standard deviation
of actual control cost difference across ten MC simulations,
respectively.
exhibit opposite trends as ∆ changes. The privacy loss, mea-
sured by MI, monotonically decreases as ∆ gets larger. This
is the manifestation of the intrinsic utility-privacy trade-off
embedded in the main optimization problem (12). As the
performance constraint ∆ is more relaxed, a smaller value of
MI can be attained and thus privacy can be better preserved.
The actual performance loss, measured by the HVAC control
cost difference (between using distorted and true data) av-
eraged across different MPC iterations and difference zones,
generally increases with ∆ and is upper bounded by ∆. This
indicates that the theoretical constraint on controller per-
formance loss in our framework is effective and can actually
provide a guarantee on the actual controller performance.
We can see that the bound is far from tight, since the frame-
work enforces the constraints on the controller performance
for every possible true occupancy value to ensure the ro-
bustness while in practice the occupancy distribution is very
spiked about the mean occupancy.
Figure 6 visualizes the distortion mechanism obtained by
solving the MI under different choices of the tolerance on
the control performance loss ∆. It can be clearly seen that
the mechanism creates a higher level of distortion as ∆ in-
creases. When ∆ is small, the resulting distortion matrix
assigns most probability mass on the diagonal, i.e., the oc-
cupancy is very likely to keep unperturbed. As ∆ gets larger,
the distortion mechanism tends to have the same rows, in
which case the distribution of distorted occupancy data is
invariant under the change of true occupancy and MI be-
tween true occupancy and perturbed occupancy, i.e., the
privacy loss, tends to be zero. We also plot the temper-
ature evolution under different distortion levels. Since we
enforce a hard constraint on temperature, we can see that
the zone temperature stays within the comfort zone for all
∆’s. However, larger ∆ would lead to a larger deviation
from the temperature controlled using the true occupancy.
5.2.3 Comparison with Other Methods
We compare the performance of the HVAC controller us-
ing our optimally perturbed data against using unperturbed
occupancy data, fixed occupancy schedule as well as ran-
domly perturbed data by other distortion methods. In Fig-
ure 7a we plot the privacy loss and control cost for con-
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Figure 6: Illustration of distortion matrix P (V |Y ) under
different controller performance guarantees. The row index
corresponds to the value of Y , while colomn index corre-
sponds to V . The zone temperature traces resulted from
the controllers using occupancy data that is randomly dis-
torted by different distortion matrices are also shown.
trollers that use the various forms of occupancy data. Fixed
occupancy schedule (assuming maximum occupancy during
working hours and zero otherwise) exposes zero information
about individual location traces, but cannot adapt to occu-
pancy variations and thus incurs considerable control cost.
The controller based on clean occupancy data is most cost-
effective but discloses maximum private information. One
of the random distortion method to be compared is uni-
form distortion scheme in which the true occupancy is per-
turbed to some value between zero to maximum occupancy
with equal probability. We carry out 10 MC simulations to
obtain the control cost incurred under this random pertur-
bation scheme. It can be seen that the uniform distortion
scheme protects the private information with compromised
controller performance.
A natural question arising is if the current occupancy sens-
ing systems provide intrinsic privacy-preserving features as
there always exists occupancy estimation errors. Can we
use a cheaper and inaccurate occupancy sensor to acqiure
privacy? As is suggested by the occupancy sensing results
in [19], the estimation noise of a real occupancy sensing sys-
tem can be modeled by a multinomial distribution which has
most probability mass at zero. Inspired by this, we use the
following multinomial distortion schemes to imitate a real
occupancy sensing system with disparate accuracies acc,
P (V n|Y n = y) =
 acc, V = y1−acc2 , V =y−1 or y+1 if y 6=01−acc
2
, V =1 or 2, if y=0
(13)
Again, MC simulations are performed to evaluate the con-
trol performance under this random perturbation, and the
results are shown in Figure 7a. It can be seen that when
the privacy loss is relatively large (or data is slightly dis-
torted), the control cost of our optimal noising scheme and
the multinomial noising scheme do not differ too much. This
is because at this level of privacy loss the two distortion
schemes behave similarly, as shown in Figure 6, where the
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Figure 7: Comparison of the privacy-utility trade-off of con-
trollers using different forms of occupancy data, evaluated
based on (a) real-world occupancy data and (b) synthesized
data.
occupancy keeps untainted with high probability. But as
the privacy loss decreases, our optimal noising scheme’s in-
telligent noise placement begins to significantly improve con-
trol performance. In addition, our optimal distortion Pareto
dominates the other schemes.
To investigate the scalability of our proposed scheme, we
create synthetic data that simulates location traces for 15 oc-
cupants based on the Augsburg dataset. We extract the oc-
cupants’ movement profile, i.e., transition parameters, from
the original dataset and randomly assign the profiles to syn-
thesized occupants. An occupant randomly chooses the next
location according to the movement profile. The privacy-
utility curve evaluated on this larger synthesized dataset is
illustrated in Figure 7b, which demonstrates that the opti-
mality of our distortion scheme is preserved when the exper-
iment is scaled up. We can see that the privacy loss of the
controller using the unperturbed occupancy gets lower when
incorporating more occupants. Although privacy risks are
lower as we scale up the experiment since with more people
sharing the space it will be more difficult to identify each
individuals, adding distortion to occupancy measurements
can preserve the privacy even further as shown in Figure 7b.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present a tractable framework to model
the trade-off between privacy and controller performance in
a holistic manner. We take occupancy-based HVAC con-
troller as an example where the objective is to utilize occu-
pancy data to enable smart controls over the HVAC system
while protect individual location information from being in-
ferred from the occupancy data. We use MI as the measure
of privacy loss, and formulate the privacy-utility trade-off by
a convex optimization problem that minimizes the privacy
loss subject to a pre-specified controller performance con-
straint. By solving the optimization problem, we can obtain
a mechanism that injects optimal amount of noise to oc-
cupancy data to enhance privacy with control performance
guarantee. We verify our framework using real-world occu-
pancy data and simulated building dynamics. It is shown
that our theoretical framework is able to provide guidelines
for practical privacy-enhanced occupancy-based HVAC sys-
tem design, and reaches a better balance of privacy and
control performance compared with other occupancy-based
controllers.
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